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A PROPOSED FAT-TAIL RISK METRIC: 
DISCLOSURES, DERIVATIVES, AND THE 
MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL RISK  
PETER CONTI-BROWN

 
INTRODUCTION 
Accurately and precisely modeling financial risk is something of a 
Holy Grail for financial theorists, regulators, and market participants. But 
like the Holy Grail, the location of a comprehensive model of risk remains 
unknown; some have even suggested that such a model is a figment of 
financial theorists’ imaginations.1 
Nowhere has that disaster been more fully evident than in the recent 
failure of risk models to adequately prepare the marketplace for the 
collapse of the market for mortgage-backed securities and credit 
derivatives, and the financial crisis that followed. Because of the mistaken 
assumptions associated with some risk models, otherwise vigilant market 
participants were blinded to the risks that brought the global financial 
system to the brink of collapse.  
One of the modeling critics’ primary targets is the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR). In the 1980s, practitioners created a model to focus on the risk 
exposure experienced by a single firm.
2
 VaR is meant to give traders—
and, eventually, investors and regulators—a snapshot of how much money 
a firm might lose in a single day. That dollar figure is easy to comprehend 
and straightforward in its application; if a firm is uncomfortable with that 
exposure, the firm can make appropriate adjustments to its trading 
strategies and positions. As VaR continued to develop, traders and 
academics weren’t the only ones paying attention. Soon, regulators from 
 
 
  J.D. (2010), Stanford Law School. My appreciation to Professors Rob Daines, Joe Grundfest, 
and Larry Mitchell for engaging discussions on this topic, Professor Larry Mitchell for excellent edits, 
Britton Olson for LaTeX help, and especially Nikki Conti-Brown for trenchant debate, analysis, and 
editing. Remaining errors are my own.  
 1. See Nassim Taleb, Against VAR, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, Apr. 1997, http://www. 
derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/1997/0497fea2.asp. 
 2. In reality, the ―model‖ is a family of models, whose main elements have been effectively in 
place since the portfolio-analysis revolution beginning in the 1950s. See GLYN A. HOLTON, VALUE-
AT-RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE 14–17 (2003). At risk of oversimplification, I use the term ―VaR‖ to 
refer to the entire family of models, not simply the one by JP Morgan in the 1990s, which created that 
name.  
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the U.S. Federal Reserve,
3
 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC),
4
 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
5
 and the UK 
Financial Supervisory Authority
6
 endorsed it as an adequate tool for 
setting banking capital adequacy requirements, and for appropriate risk 
disclosures to shareholders.
7
  
The financial crisis reveals, however, an application of Mencken’s 
aphorism: for the complex problem of risk measurement, VaR produces an 
answer that is ―neat, plausible, and wrong.‖8 VaR is not useful in times of 
unforeseen volatility, as extreme events occur far more frequently than a 
95% confidence level would suggest. In statistical terms, the tails of the 
distribution become ―fat.‖ When model-altering events occur more 
frequently than originally anticipated, the model itself becomes useless. So 
it is with VaR in times of financial crisis. 
None of these observations is new.
9
 And, in light of these weaknesses, 
financial economists have filled the literature with revisions and 
refinements that seek to improve the model.
10
 In offering an alternative, 
 
 
 3. Capital Requirements for Market Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,142 (proposed July 25, 1995) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. 2) (proposing a ―pre-commitment approach,‖ wherein a bank would commit 
to a maximum trading loss in a given time horizon).  
 4. See SEC Accounting Policies for Certain Derivative Instruments, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(n) 
(2009); SEC Financial Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 228.310 (2007) (requiring firms to disclose quantitative 
information regarding their derivatives’ positions using VaR-style models). The SEC was the first of 
any regulator to require VaR-style models, beginning as early as 1980. See RICHARD DALE, RISK AND 
REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS 78 (1996). 
 5. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AN INTERNAL MODEL-BASED 
APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 6 (1995).  
 6. See SEC. & FUTURES AUTH., BOARD NOTICE 249: IMPLEMENTATION BY SFA OF THE 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY DIRECTIVE (1995). 
 7. This is not to say that each regulator uses an identical model. Indeed, there is significant 
variation among the various constructions. The point is only that the overarching principle of portfolio 
theory, which is the core of the VaR model, is present in each case. See Elroy Dimson & Paul Marsh, 
Capital Requirements for Securities Firms, 50 J. FIN. 821, 825–31 (1995), for an explanation of the 
portfolio-family of models to which VaR belongs.  
 8. See H.L. MENCKEN, The Divine Afflatus, in PREJUDICES: SECOND SERIES 155, 158 (1920). 
To be fair, this is a weakness that VaR’s leading proponents have predicted. See Philippe Jorion, In 
Defense of VAR, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, Apr. 1997, http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/ 
archive/1997/0497fea2.asp (conceding that ―the purpose of VAR is not to describe the worst possible 
outcomes‖).  
 9. See Rick Bookstaber, The Fat-Tailed Straw Man (Mar. 10, 2009), http://rick.bookstaber.com/ 
2009/03/fat-tailed-straw-man.html.  
 10. See Jon Danielsson & Casper G. De Vries, Value-at-Risk and Extreme Returns, 60 ANNALES 
D’ÉCONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 239, 239 (2000) (advocating for the use of ―a semi-parametric 
method for unconditional Value-at-Risk (VaR)‖ that better captures extreme results); François M. 
Longin, From Value at Risk to Stress Testing: The Extreme Value Approach, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1097 (2000) (using univariate extreme value theory to capture financial crises within the VaR model); 
R. Tyrrell Rockafellar & Stanislav Uryasev, Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk, 2 J. RISK 21 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/6
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this Comment makes no attempt to enter that mathematics-intensive 
fracas. Instead, I propose a lawyer’s solution: use a form of mandatory 
disclosure for off-balance-sheet guarantees and over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives to provide the data necessary to describe the risk of a firm’s 
economic footprint in the unlikely event of catastrophic collapse. With this 
data, regulators and firms could compute what I preliminarily call a Fat-
Tail Risk Metric (FTRM), or a metric for determining the impact of the 
most financially devastating high-impact, low-probability events. Such a 
disclosure requirement could have three principal benefits. First, requiring 
mandatory disclosure of contingent liabilities—namely, derivatives and 
off-balance-sheet guarantees—will resolve the ongoing difficulties in 
record keeping that have plagued the industry. Second, a scale that 
measures the size of a firm’s impact upon catastrophic collapse provides a 
relative measure with which regulators can compare firms of equal market 
capitalization and/or balance sheet assets that have differing remote-risk 
profiles. Third, and most importantly, the FTRM will provide a steady 
stream of data that has, until now, been impossible to gather and could 
prove essential in understanding risk measurement at the firm level over 
the coming decades. With that information, defining ―too big to fail‖ may 
simply become a question of basic econometrics.  
VAR–WHAT IT DOES, WHY IT FAILS  
VaR is, essentially, an expansion and application of modern portfolio 
analysis as developed over the last half century by Harry Markowitz and 
many others.
11
 Portfolio analysis uses mathematical models of the 
covariance between assets within a portfolio to predict the risk inherent to 
that portfolio.
12
 VaR uses these models and historical data to report 
information in three parts: (1) a specific dollar amount lost, (2) within a 
fixed time period, and (3) with a specific level of confidence.
13
 For 
example, a risk-management officer in a bank or hedge fund might report 
to a CEO or board member, with 95% certainty, that market conditions are 
 
 
(2000) (describing a new approach to VaR that focuses on the conditional VaR as a superior estimate 
of risk).  
 11. See JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 238 (2009). I highlight Markowitz, 
but many others are equally deserving of attention for their contributions. For excellent histories of 
that revolution, see generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF 
MODERN WALL STREET (1992). 
 12. This is a gross simplification. Any leading corporate finance textbook will provide a fuller 
explanation. See, e.g., JONATHAN BERK & PETER MARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 323–62 (2007).  
 13. PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR CONTROLLING DERIVATIVES 
RISK 108 (2d ed. 2001).  
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such that the firm could lose $50 million in a given day. If market 
volatility increases during the day, that figure could change. VaR therefore 
gives clear, comprehensible information that is easily operational; it’s very 
easy to conceptualize the prospects of losing $50 million, and if a manager 
or investor objects to that level of risk, the firm can adjust accordingly. 
Alternatively, if VaR sinks too low, the firm can make those necessary 
adjustments as well.
14
 The promise of VaR is that risk can be projected, 
adjusted, and controlled according to an investor’s or firm’s appetite for 
risk.  
VaR’s key assumptions are two: (1) that, for asset-price volatility, past 
is prologue, and (2) that such variations are normally distributed around a 
mean; i.e., they follow a ―bell curve.‖15 Unfortunately, in times of crisis 
neither assumption is appropriate. The distribution of asset-price volatility 
has much fatter tails—that is, the likelihood of extreme events in asset-
price swings is much higher than the normal distribution models, including 
VaR, would predict.
16
 And, as became painfully apparent in the fall of 
2008, volatility today can exceed anything in the history books. These 
failed assumptions mean that reliance on such models can lead to 
disastrous consequences. 
Goldman Sachs’ Chief Financial Officer David Viniar offers an 
illustrative example of what this means in practice. In August of 2007, 
after one of the firm’s hedge funds lost 27% of its value in a matter of 
days, Goldman injected the fund with $2 billion of its own capital. In 
defense of this dramatic action, Viniar explained: ―We were seeing things 
that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row.‖17 Viniar 
makes explicit the assumption that such price swings are normally 
distributed, and says—whether accurately or for dramatic effect—that 
these events are 25 times the average variation around the mean change in 
prices. 
 
 
 14. Too conservative of an investment may lead a firm to miss profitable investment 
opportunities.  
 15. For more explanation of the normal distribution and its desirable statistical properties in the 
context of financial modeling, see DAVID RUPPERT, STATISTICS AND FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 80–
84 (2004). For a more thorough explanation of VaR’s assumptions, see The Risks of Financial 
Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and 
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard 
Bookstaber), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2009/ 
Oversight/10sep/Bookstaber_Testimony.pdf. 
 16. See Danielsson & De Vries, supra note 10, at 242–43. 
 17. Peter Thal Larsen, Goldman Pays the Price of Being Big, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at 37.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/6
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To put this in perspective,
 
a 2-standard deviation loss event should 
occur only approximately 2.5% of the time, or roughly once every 44 
days; a 5-standard deviation event should occur only once every 13,932 
years; a 10-standard deviation event only once every 525 quadrillion 
millennia (the universe, incidentally, is estimated to be between 12 and 14 
billion years old);
18
 and a 25-standard deviation event should occur 
roughly once every 1.309 X 10
136
 years.
19
 Thus, the expected time between 
two 25-standard deviation events has more millennia than the universe has 
number of particles.
20
 And yet, according to Viniar, it occurred day after 
day, in August of 2007, well before the fire sale of Bear Stearns, the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, or the bailout of the financial sector, with all 
the associated market upheaval that followed.
21
 Thus, the VaR models 
Viniar and others used to explain such 25-standard deviation moves, day 
after day, were not only wrong; they were catastrophically wrong. 
Thus, in addition to the flawed assumptions mentioned above, VaR has 
two other weaknesses. First, in times of crisis, VaR fails to provide any 
clear content on risk exposures in the long tail, especially when those tails 
are fat. When high-impact, low-probability events—what trader and best-
selling author Nassim Taleb calls ―Black Swans‖22—occur with such 
frequency that they dominate a firm or portfolio, VaR loses its utility.
23
 
Second, VaR’s presentation of the risk statistic as a dollar figure has 
deceptively precise appeal. Any manager, investor, or regulator knows 
what it means to lose $50 million in a day; adjusting a risk portfolio to 
 
 
 18. Brian Chaboyer et al., A Lower Limit on the Age of the Universe, 271 SCI. 957, 960 (1996).  
 19. See Kevin Dowd, John Cotter, Chris Humphrey & Margaret Woods, How Unlucky is 25-
Sigma?, 34 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 76, 77–78 (2008).  
 20. See Bryan Clair, The Biggest Numbers in the Universe, STRANGE HORIZONS, Apr. 2, 2001, 
http://strangehorizons.com/2001/20010402/biggest_numbers.shtml (estimating that the universe has 
between 1072 and 1081 particles). 
 21. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND 
POLICY ACTIONS (2010), http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf. 
 22. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, at 
xvii–xviii (2007).  
 23. In VaR’s defense, its practitioners never intended it to make predictions about fat tails. Even 
the most ardent of VaR proponents have never, on any record the author could locate, made the 
contrary claim. Indeed, investment textbooks openly note the existence of non-normally-distributed 
returns. See The Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Richard Bookstaber), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/ 
file/Commdocs/hearings/2009/Oversight/10sep/Bookstaber_Testimony.pdf (citing ZVI BODIE, ALEX 
KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 148 (8th ed. 2008) (containing section titled ―Measurement 
of Risk with Non-normal Distributions‖)). 
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adapt for that kind of risk is a relatively straightforward enterprise. The 
problem, as seen in the August 2007 example, is that that dollar figure is 
nearly meaningless in a time of crisis. The VaR statistic masks that reality.  
Resolving the VaR problem—and, indeed, the problem with nearly all 
mathematical models of market behavior—is a tall order, and not one 
seriously entertained here. Others have documented these concerns more 
thoroughly and articulately than I can duplicate.
24
 For lawyers and 
regulators, though, the central conclusion is essential: VaR cannot be used, 
by itself, to measure the potential that a given firm will pose systemic risk 
to the economy.
25
  
THE FAT-TAIL RISK METRIC 
In times of crisis, asset-price volatility, almost tautologically, follows 
no statistically useful probability distribution.
26
 To be useful to regulators, 
investors, and firm management, then, a risk metric must reveal some 
information about the events that may occur without necessarily providing 
insight into statistical frequency. That is, the metric should address the 
question of how much a firm would lose in an apocalyptic, complete 
blackout scenario where every trade goes against it, every liability comes 
due, and every off-balance-sheet commitment is called. At that point, the 
firm could not lose more money. It is the final backstop.
27
 
Calculating this kind of doomsday scenario with absolute certainty may 
be an impossible enterprise in and of itself; many of these losses would 
necessarily be conjectural. In its place, we need an analytical proxy that 
captures the fullest extent of risk exposure possible without becoming 
logistically infeasible to compute. I propose the following proxy: a firm’s 
 
 
 24. See supra note 15; The Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and 
Technology, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Nassim Taleb), available at http://democrats.science. 
house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/ hearings/2009/Oversight/10sep/Taleb_Testimony.pdf. 
 25. Of course, VaR would be perfect at identifying firms that pose systemic risk on VaR’s own 
terms. That is, if a firm or entity took huge, clear risks that even VaR’s models would suggest 
imprudent—such as ―there is a 10% chance that this firm will lose $50 billion‖—then VaR would be 
very useful, indeed. Some have argued that this is the very situation that occurred in the trading that 
precipitated the bankruptcy of Orange County in 1994. See PHILIPPE JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: 
DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 137, 156 (1995).  
 26. This is the realm of the unknown, where the specific population distribution function that 
describes the price movement is being written in real time.  
 27. Most statisticians will insist, rightly, that this is an impossible standard for most distributions; 
the distribution curve is an asymptotic function that will never actually attain 0. Thus, capturing the 
remaining 5% is impossible. This is particularly true for firms that have sold put options or otherwise 
shorted any asset with a theoretically limitless maximum price. Even so, as with all asymptotic 
functions, we can use the proxies described in this paper to get arbitrarily close to the limit.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/6
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doomsday scenario can be adequately described by the sum of (1) its full, 
notional derivatives exposure, including both OTC and exchange-traded 
derivatives;
28
 (2) the value of all other contingent liabilities, including 
guarantees for structured investment vehicles (SIV) and special purpose 
vehicles (SPV); and (3) the value of a firm’s balance-sheet liabilities.29 I 
call this standard the Fat-Tail Risk Metric (FTRM). 
Much of this information is already available. Most obviously, publicly 
traded firms disclose their balance-sheet liabilities in their annual 10-K 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
30
 Also, banks 
regulated under the Basel I regime—including all banks in the United 
States—must disclose their off-balance-sheet contingent liabilities, 
including letters of credit and loans that have yet to be called.
31
  
The FTRM extends this already-available data in three primary ways. 
First, it would be required of all entities that must register with the SEC, 
including the otherwise anemically regulated hedge-fund industry. Second, 
and unlike the capital adequacy requirements under Basel I,
32
 the FTRM 
would not discount risks seen as safer than others. Additionally, such off-
balance-sheet contingent liabilities would have to be reported by all firms, 
not just banks. Third, the FTRM would require the total disclosure of all 
derivatives, which, as of this writing, remained almost completely 
unregulated.  
 
 
 28. In using the total ―notional‖ value of derivatives exposure, I am aware of the ongoing debate 
between calculating derivatives markets by their notional value versus their market value. Under 
normal-functioning market conditions, the market value of the derivatives exposure—which ―nets‖ out 
logically conflicting positions—is the relevant figure. However, in the kinds of market conditions that 
will prevail during times of crisis, the ability to net derivatives exposure depends on the solvency of 
counterparties—that is, those individuals and companies who sell protection must, in turn, be available 
to make good on those contracts. This was the problem with AIG; it had led the way on selling CDS 
for CDOs, and its threatened collapse would have left counter-parties holding the bag for billions of 
dollars. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 959, 971–72 
(2009). Thus, for purposes of FTRM, the broader picture of counterparty risk is necessary in order to 
find the size of the absolute losses a firm might experience. For more on that distinction, see Miguel A. 
Segoviano & Manmohan Singh, Counterparty Risk in the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/258, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1316726. 
 29. Note that the firm’s assets are excluded by inference. In a doomsday scenario, its assets 
would become valueless either because the market deemed them worthless—as in stock of a bankrupt 
entity—or because the markets would be frozen and could reflect no value, as in the value of property, 
plants, and equipment that could not be sold.  
 30. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08 (2009). 
 31. See 12 C.F.R. § 325 app.A (2009) (Statement of Policy of Risk-Based Capital). 
 32. See id. 
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The FTRM is, to be sure, implausible in some senses: we must envision 
a world where every piece of financial property, every investment, and 
every trade cuts against the firm to create a colossal loss. This kind of loss 
has never occurred. Long-Term Capital Management, the hedge fund that 
was bailed out by banks on Wall Street in 1998 at the insistence of the 
New York Fed, did not create this kind of crater.
33
 Nor, arguably, have 
other financial collapses, from Lehman Brothers to AIG to Barings 
Brothers, created such craters. Government protections—including, of 
course, bankruptcy protection—will intervene long before this kind of 
damage is actually done. The point is not that the FTRM would measure 
actual losses, but that it would measure the relative and absolute size of 
the firm’s commitments in the event that each contract or transaction 
turned against the firm in question. It therefore provides a proxy for 
extreme risk that other such indicators alone—including a balance sheet, 
market capitalization, and certainly VaR—cannot match. 
The FTRM, unless adjusted, would be expressed in a dollar figure—it 
is simply the sum of three other dollar figures. But that should be avoided 
for two reasons. First, as noted with VaR, a dollar figure gives a sense of 
false precision. Second, and unique to the FTRM, the resulting figure will 
almost certainly be cartoonishly large. For example, the total notional 
value of the global-derivatives market in June 2009 was estimated at over 
$600 trillion, and its market value was estimated at $25 trillion.
34
 By 
comparison, global GDP is roughly $60 trillion.
35
 At some point well 
below $25 trillion, even the most sophisticated of investors lose touch with 
the meaning of money. For these reasons, the FTRM should not be 
reported in dollars, but rather as a single figure that provides the ability to 
make absolute and comparative judgments. Following the well-established 
Richter scale,
36
 transforming these outstanding liabilities into a 
 
 
 33. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 191 (2000) (reporting that, even during the last weeks before the hedge fund was bailed 
out, some of its trades continued to pay out).  
 34. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: DECEMBER 2009, at A103 (2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
 35. See Google, Public Data, http://www.google.com (search ―gross domestic product, world;‖ 
then follow ―Gross Domestic Product, World‖ hyperlink) (last visited May 14, 2010).  
 36. One of this Comment’s contributions is to highlight the work of scholars who have already 
proposed using logarithmic models for risk, providing a sort of Richter scale for financial earthquakes. 
Although their work has been largely about systemic risk rather than individual firm risk, the models 
may prove useful if applied on hypothesized crises following the implosion of individual firms. See 
generally Bertrand B. Maillet & Thierry L. Michel, The Impact of the 9/11 Events on the American 
and French Stock Markets, 13 REV. INT’L ECON. 597 (2005) (using a model based on the Richter scale 
to indicate the consequences of 9/11 on stock markets); Bertrand Maillet & Thierry Michel, An Index 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/6
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logarithmic scale would render them more useful. Mathematically:
37
 
FTRM = log (TDE + OBSL + BSL) 
where TDE is the netted notional value of a firm’s total derivatives 
exposure; OBSL is its off-balance-sheet liabilities, such as guarantees for 
a firm’s SIVs, sponsored hedge funds,38 or any other liability that could 
migrate back to the balance sheet in a time of crisis; and BSL is balance-
sheet liabilities, traditionally expressed in a firm’s corporate filings. Thus, 
the FTRM would be reported as a non-dollar figure. For example, if a 
firm’s notional derivatives exposure is $10 billion, its balance-sheet 
liabilities are $5 billion, and its off-balance-sheet guarantees are $1 billion, 
then its FTRM, under this model, is 10.204—which is the log of $16 
billion. The purpose of expressing the figure on a log scale is simply to 
take risk metrics out of the business of the false precision that plagues 
VaR models. A logarithmic expression, like the Richter scale measuring 
earthquakes, gives a scaled sense of risk that is useful for absolute and 
comparative purposes, without the extra baggage of false precision.
39
  
The idea that we should disclose contingent liabilities is not, in and of 
itself, new. Indeed, the entire apparatus of modern capital adequacy 
regulation openly acknowledges the role of contingent liabilities. And the 
House of Representatives has recently passed its version of the financial 
regulatory reform bill, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2009, which includes references to disclosure, however vague.
40
 
But although disclosure and transparency have been a significant plank in 
the Obama Administration’s proposals41 and disclosure does figure into 
 
 
of Market Shocks Based on Multiscale Analysis, 3 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 88 (2003) (using a model based 
on the Richter scale to indicate the consequences of general shocks on stock markets). 
 37. I apologize to readers for the somewhat sanctimonious use of LaTeX to provide a simple 
mathematical illustration of the textual argument. I reiterate that this is a legal proposal, not an 
economic one. This bit of oversimplified mathematical tinkering is intended for illustration purposes 
only; financial economists and other empiricists can and should do something far more rigorous than is 
presented here.  
 38. Sponsored hedge funds were at the heart of Bear Stearns’ ultimate collapse. See HENRY 
PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 94–95 (2010). 
 39. Again, this logarithmic function is meant only as an illustration. It remains to be seen 
whether risk exposure becomes interesting only as it increases to certain orders of magnitude. Creating 
a more robust model must follow the disclosure of the information described above.  
 40. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (as passed by House, Dec. 12, 2009). See generally Carl 
Hulse, House Looks at Preventing the Next Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, http://thecaucus. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/house-looks-at-preventing-the-next-collapse/ (describing the bill).  
 41. See The Administration’s Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform, Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, United 
States Department of the Treasury), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs 
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the present version of the bill,
42
 neither the Administration nor the 
Congress have promoted a form of disclosure that will contribute to our 
understanding of systemic risk. The data disclosures required by the 
FTRM would be more precise, and would therefore provide more 
analytically beneficial content, than the disclosures discussed in current 
iterations of the regulatory reform bill. 
WHAT FTRM WILL DO 
The FTRM, however ultimately refined, would have at least three 
important benefits centrally relevant to the current debate on financial 
regulatory reform. First, as already mentioned, it will provide a basic sense 
of the size of the crater that an imploded firm would leave behind. In a 
world of off-balance-sheet contingent obligations, a balance sheet, 
designed to provide the same function, fails to capture the full measure of 
impact. As Congress and the Obama Administration debate how best to 
measure firms that are either too big or too interconnected to fail, a 
sticking point has been a definitional one: how big is too big?
43
 While the 
FTRM will initially lack much informational content, a large or small 
FTRM will eventually be a useful guide in determining whether or not a 
firm poses a systemic risk to the broader economy.  
Second, a regulatory requirement for firms to report the inputs 
necessary for the FTRM would force these firms to maintain the 
information themselves. The idea that such regulation would be necessary 
to force these firms to keep track of their own contracts would strike most 
proponents of free markets as preposterous; firms have plenty of other 
incentives in place to keep track of their own business. Arguing otherwise 
would be akin to arguing that MasterCard should face mandatory 
disclosure requirements for all of the credit card transactions it clears 
because without such disclosure, it simply wouldn’t record them in a 
timely or accessible manner.  
 
 
_dem/testimony_-_sec_geithner.pdf (discussing the need to force any entity with an implicit or explicit 
governmental guarantee to undergo strict supervision). 
 42. See H.R. 4173 § 3104 (providing for the public recording of aggregate swap data, but limited 
only to ―aggregate data on swap trading volumes and positions‖).  
 43. See The Administration’s Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform, Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, United 
States Department of the Treasury), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs 
_dem/testimony_-_sec_geithner.pdf. The Bill passed by the House—H.R. 4173, Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009—would place broad discretion in a Financial Services Oversight 
Council to determine whether an institution has grown too large or interconnected to continue in its 
current form. See H.R. 4173 §§ 1001–1008, 1105.  
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As absurd as it may sound, this is precisely the condition that many 
derivatives-trading firms have faced. In 2005–06, firms engaged in OTC 
derivatives trading had a dramatic 8- to 9-month backlog of unrecorded 
derivatives contracts; ―for every 100 new trades [executed on the trading 
floor], there were about 1,000 aged unconfirmed trades.‖44 Tim Geithner, 
then President of the New York Federal Reserve, made resolving that 
backlog a touchstone of his administration in the years before the financial 
crisis.
45
 And while there has been success reported on that front,
46
 the 
question remains open whether new financial innovations could create a 
similar problem, especially in more opaque areas of the markets. If 
reporting the FTRM becomes as basic as filing a 10-K with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, with comparable penalties for reporting 
failures, then firms will—once and for all—get this crucial piece of 
accounting right. 
 
Last, and most importantly, the FTRM provides data about the 
aggregate derivatives exposure for each firm, and aggregate exposure to 
implicit guarantees for off-balance-sheet entities.
47
 Such disclosure for 
OTC derivatives and off-balance-sheet contingent liabilities does not 
currently exist.
48
 Of course, firms may be extremely reluctant to disclose 
 
 
 44. DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA LI & THEO LUBKE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2010), available at http://www. 
newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf.  
 45. See Yalman Onaran & Michael McKee, In Geithner We Trust Eludes Treasury as Market 
Fails to Recover, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aLhs5 
Byln00k&pid=20601109 (describing Geithner’s role in ―clear[ing] away the backlog‖). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Recall that the source of tens of billions of dollars of Citibank’s write-downs resulted from 
guarantees that it had offered on the senior risk for its off-balance-sheet Special Investment Vehicles. 
See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS 
CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 204–06 (2009) (explaining 
how the guarantees were in the form of essentially risk-free super-senior tranches of CDOs); DAVID 
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 104–05 (2009) (explaining 
the relationship between Citigroup and its SIVs).  
 48. Disclosure in this context has been a rare source of consensus in the conversations on 
financial reform. See First Public Hearing, Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 8–9 
(2010) (statement of Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Executive Officer, Goldman Sachs), available at 
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Transcript.pdf (citing the need to improve disclosure 
and risk valuation methods in derivatives markets); Recent Developments in the U.S. Financial 
Markets and Regulatory Responses to Them, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/CoxSECtestimony71508FINAL.pdf 
(calling for increased transparency in bringing ―hidden risks to light‖); Letter from Ams. for Fin. 
Reform to Congress (Aug. 2, 2009), available at http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2009/08/afr-urges-
congress-to-regulate-the-derivatives-markets/ (urging Congress to impose disclosure requirements for 
OTC derivatives); Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Harry 
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability. 
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to the public this kind of exposure, particularly since so much of a firm’s 
profits will be linked to its success at investing in this space. We can table 
that issue for now by imposing a disclosure requirement only to the 
systemic risk regulator, and not to the overall market;
49
 under the Obama 
Administration’s proposal, this task would fall jointly to a new Financial 
Services Oversight Council and to the Federal Reserve.
50
 The Federal 
Reserve, in particular, already has a robust tradition of conducting 
independent econometric research, for both internal and external 
consumption.
51
 Forcing that disclosure will allow government researchers 
to determine correlative and causal connections between fat-tail risk and 
any number of other relevant statistics, including bankruptcy rates, default 
rates, credit default swap spreads,
52
 stock price, profitability, counterparty 
risk, specific industry (where relevant), geographic factors, or any other 
appropriate variable.  
The opportunity to conduct time-series research with this kind of panel 
data is tremendously valuable. Over the course of ten, twenty, fifty years, 
or more, researchers could piece together the story of risk exposure as it 
relates to a number of other variables. Indeed, before we can prevent firms 
from becoming too big to fail,
53
 we must know what that term even means. 
By generating a constant flow of this failure-oriented data, researchers can 
begin to tease out relationships between the off-balance-sheet risk 
measured by FTRM and other factors. And because it will be measured 
across the economy, the data will be useful both for comparative and 
absolute purposes. This is the most important contribution of the FTRM. 
Debates about financial reform are frequently characterized by more heat 
 
 
gov/docs/OTCletter.pdf (advocating for more disclosure in OTC derivatives markets). Standing up in 
favor of derivatives disclosure is, however, a little like standing up in favor of democracy. It feels good 
to say it, but doesn’t really mean anything in the abstract.  
 49. I am not opposed to this move. The burden should be on firms themselves to prove that the 
disclosure of this information prevents them from engaging in the markets. I simply include this caveat 
to focus the debate.  
 50. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 51. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Research Staff and Resources, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/default.htm (last updated Jan. 15, 2010). 
 52. Credit default swap spreads refer to the cost to buy ―insurance‖ against some kind of 
triggering event, usually a corporate default. If the market thinks that a company is heading toward 
default, the cost of buying insurance will rise. The amount that one party must pay another to secure 
this insurance is called the ―spread.‖ See David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, FED. RES. 
BANK ATLANTA: ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 1, 4.  
 53. This is a newly stated goal of the Federal Reserve. See Kevin Warsh, Member, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks to the New York Association for Business Economics: 
Regulation and Its Discontents 9 (Feb. 3, 2010) (declaring a need for a new ―financial architecture‖ 
that includes greater regulation, wherein ―no firm should be too big to fail‖).  
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than light; a call for more data can help resolve some of those perennial 
debates. 
CONCLUSION: WHAT FTRM DOES NOT—AND CANNOT—DO 
Initially, the FTRM will not be very helpful in providing a basis for 
risk-management decisions. A FTRM score of 10.126, for example, does 
not answer the crucial question of whether a firm is over- or underexposed 
to risk. Thus, a board member who inquires about her firm’s fat-tail risk 
exposure will have, initially, no idea what to make of the single- or 
double-digit figure she hears. But the FTRM will prove its use with time 
and experience. Financial crises are perennial;
54
 we will see similar events 
again. Having these new and important data will be a boon to future 
researchers and regulators in determining how fat-tail risk relates to future 
financial crises.  
As the sources above indicate, I am not the first to advocate for greater 
disclosure. The contribution here is to focus that disclosure not just on the 
workaday risks that firms face, but on the extreme risks that they face. The 
FTRM addresses that issue not by assuming that such backstop failure will 
ever occur, but by using the size of that economic footprint as a proxy—
and test variable—for the systemic risk that a given firm may carry. 
The FTRM proposed here raises far more questions than I have 
answered: Who will determine what constitutes off-balance-sheet 
exposure? Who will enforce disclosure? What institutions will be 
affected? What about the inevitable attempts to perform regulatory 
arbitrage around such disclosure? What will happen if firms move their 
derivatives trading overseas to avoid this disclosure? In so short a space, it 
is impossible to respond to the many concerns that might be raised before 
a mandatory disclosure of this data could occur. Ultimately, very few of 
the details highlighted here are essential to the concept that I propose. 
Even the proxies discussed here could be challenged as insufficiently 
related to fat-tail risk. But these details are of secondary importance. The 
general architecture of the proposal is the key: we must mandate 
disclosure of contingent liabilities (especially OTC derivatives), reported 
in such an accessible way that individual firms’ data can be collected and 
 
 
 54. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 3–20 (2009) (describing the familiar trajectory that financial crises 
have taken over eight centuries of experience); see also CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, 
PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 1 (4th ed. 2000) (setting out a literary 
version of the history of financial crises).  
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systematically researched over time. In that way, the FTRM is a modest 
step in getting closer to understanding how risk is measured, and how to 
use that measurement to understand catastrophic financial collapses that 
undermine our entire economic system. 
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